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Abstract. Task-PIOA is a modeling framework for distributed systems
with both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviors. It is suitable for
cryptographic applications because its task-based scheduling mechanism
is less powerful than the traditional perfect-information scheduler. More-
over, one can speak of two types of complexity restrictions: time bounds
on description of task-PIOAs and time bounds on length of schedules.
This distinction, along with the flexibility of nondeterministic specifi-
cations, are interesting departures from existing formal frameworks for
computational security.
The current paper presents a new approximate implementation relation
for task-PIOAs. This relation is transitive and is preserved under hid-
ing of external actions. Also, it is shown to be preserved under concur-
rent composition, with any polynomial number of substitutions. Building
upon this foundation, we present the notion of structures, which classifies
communications into two categories: those with a distinguisher environ-
ment and those with an adversary. We then formulate secure emulation
in the spirit of traditional simulation-based security, and a composition
theorem follows as a corollary of the composition theorem for the new
approximate implementation relation.
11 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are distributed algorithms that must achieve security
properties such as authentication and secret communication, while operating in
environments that include adversarial components. Security and correctness of
such protocols can be vital to the survival of commercial and military enterprises.
However, many cryptographic protocols exhibit complex, subtle behavior, so ver-
ifying their security is not easy. Informal verification is not reliable enough; what
is needed is a set of rigorous, formal verification methods that can assert protocol
security and correctness, while being reasonably easy for protocol designers to
use.
One of the main sources for intricacies in security analysis of these protocols
is the fact that in most interesting cases security can hold only in a “compu-
tational sense”, namely only against computationally bounded adversaries, only
probabilistically, and only under computational hardness assumptions. Current
security analyses of protocols deal with this issue in one of two ways. One way
is to first analyze the protocol in an idealized model where cryptographic al-
gorithms are represented via symbolic operations and security assertions can
be absolute rather than “computational” (e.g., [1–9]); then, additional steps are
taken outside the formal model to provide security guarantees when the symbolic
operations are replaced by real algorithms (e.g., [10–12]).
An alternative approach is to extend the formal model so as to directly
capture “computational security” within the model itself. This requires repre-
senting within the model resource bounded, probabilistic computations as well
as probabilistic relations between systems and system components. Such models
include Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Process Calculus (PPC) [13–15], Reac-
tive Simulatability (RSIM) [16–18], Universally Composable (UC) Security [19],
Task-PIOA [20, 21] and Inexhaustible Interactive Turing Machine (IITM) [22].
Each of these frameworks can be decomposed into two “layers”: (i) a founda-
tional layer, which consists of a general model of concurrent computation with
time bounds, not specific to security protocols, and (ii) a security layer that
typically follows the general outline of simulation-based security [23–29]. Unlike
the security layer, the foundation layer varies widely across different frameworks.
We summarize a few main differences below.
Description of concurrent processes. PPC is process theoretic, RSIM and Task-
PIOA are based on abstract state machines, and UC and IITM are based on
interactive Turing machines. In RSIM, UC and IITM, machines are purely prob-
abilistic, meaning that their behaviors are completely determined up to inputs
and coin tosses. In contrast, PPC and Task-PIOA allow nondeterministic pro-
cess specifications. More detailed comparisons of Task-PIOA against PPC and
RSIM can be found in the latest version of [30].
Sequential vs. non-sequential scheduling. The two ITM-based frameworks, UC
and ITTM, use sequential scheduling. This means machines are activated in
succession, where the current active machine triggers the next one by sending
2a message. RSIM machines use a similar mechanism, but with special “buffer”
machines to capture message delays and “clock ports” to control the scheduling
of message delivery. Hence, non-sequential scheduling may be implemented in
RSIM; however, in actual protocol analysis, sequential scheduling is typically
used (e.g., [31]). With the exception of its sequential variant [32], PPC imple-
ments non-sequential scheduling with scheduler functions (or Markov chains)
that select the next action from a set of enabled actions. Task-PIOA is also
non-sequential, using arbitrary oblivious task sequences to determine the next
transition. We refer to [33] for examples showing that the choice between sequen-
tial and non-sequential scheduling leads to different notions of simulation-based
security.
Complexity bounds. In PPC, processes are finite expressions built up from a
grammar that contains bounded replication operators !q(k), where k is the secu-
rity parameter and q is a polynomial. Given any process P, !q(k)(P) is evaluated
as q(k) copies of P in parallel. It is proven in [15] that every variable-closed pro-
cess expression can be evaluated in time polynomial in the security parameter. In
RSIM, abstract machines are realized by Turing machines that are either poly-
nomial time in the security parameter or in the overall length of inputs, although
major results such as composition theorems are proven only for the former no-
tion of polynomial time. In UC and IITM, ITMs may have runtime polynomial
in the overall length of inputs, provided certain restrictions are observed. These
restrictions make sure that the runtime of an entire system is polynomial in the
security parameter.
Task-PIOA occupies an interesting middle ground in the treatment of time
bounds. Each task-PIOA1 must have description bounded by a polynomial in
the security parameter. This applies to the representations of states, actions,
transitions, etc. In addition, the transition relation must be computable by a
probabilistic Turing machine with runtime polynomial in the security parameter.
However, there is no a priori bound imposed on the number of transitions that
a task-PIOA may perform. Hence, a task-PIOA specification has potentially
unbounded behavior. A final restriction on runtime is imposed only when we
compare the behaviors of different task-PIOAs using implementation relations.
We believe it is meaningful to consider these two types of time bounds sepa-
rately, since they express limitations of different nature. For example, in modeling
long-lived security protocols [34], limitations on what a machine can do in one
step (or in a bounded amount of time) are quite different from limitations on
the total lifetime of the machine.
Also, as illustrated in [33], this separation of time bounds allows us to define
unbounded forwarders without any additional mechanism, such as the input
guards of [32, 22]. (As shown in [32], the existence of forwarders has a great
impact on the relationships between different notions of simulated-security.) Nor
do we need to face the usual hassles associated with ITMs that are polynomial
time in the overall length of inputs. That is, we do not need to impose special
1 Technically, we should refer to task-PIOA families. We omit “families” for simplicity.
3restrictions, such as those in UC and IITM, to make sure that computation
resources are not “created” excessively as machines send inputs to each other.
1.1 Composability of Secure Emulation
A notable advantage of simulation-based security is its potential security pre-
serving composability properties. Indeed, one of the main motivations behind
the PPC, RSIM and UC frameworks was to obtain a very general composition
operation that is provably security-preserving.
In a previous case study [20], we followed closely the setup of simulation-based
security, and, in a more recent paper [33], we gave a generic formulation of secure
emulation in the Task-PIOA framework. The main goal of this paper is to prove a
polynomial composition theorem for our notion of secure emulation. While such
theorems have been obtained in many of the aforementioned frameworks [19, 14,
35, 22], our version is interesting in its own right.
First of all, as pointed out in [33], the choice between sequential and non-
sequential scheduling schemes gives rise to incomparable notions of security.
In other words, even if we use the same high-level formulation of security,
there exist protocols that are secure under sequential scheduling but not under
non-sequential scheduling, and vice versa. Since Task-PIOA uses non-sequential
scheduling, our composition theorem is not a simple transposition of composition
theorems in sequential frameworks.
Secondly, our secure emulation is defined in terms of a new approximate
implementation relation (≤strongneg,pt) for task-PIOAs. As a result, our composition
proof consists of two layers: we first prove a polynomial composition theorem for
≤strongneg,pt, and the composition theorem for secure emulation follows as a corollary.
Interestingly, the typical hybrid argument2 is used in proving compositionality of
≤strongneg,pt, which is completely independent of our formulation of secure emulation.
Finally, since the task-PIOA framework allows nondeterministic specifica-
tions with potentially unbounded behavior, we must handle two additional layers
of quantifications while constructing a hybrid argument. (One of these involves
schedule length bounds, while the other involves the resolution of nondetermin-
ism.) In fact, compared to the definition of approximate implementation given
in [20, 21], the definition of ≤strongneg,pt has a number of features inspired by the gen-
eral structure of hybrid arguments. We refer to Section 3 for further discussions.
We now outline our formulation of secure emulation. Following [35], we in-
troduce the notion of structures, which classifies communications into two cate-
gories: those with a distinguisher environment and those with an adversary. The
former can be likened to I/O tapes in ITM-based frameworks and service ports
in RSIM, while the latter can be likened to communication tapes and forbidden
ports. We then define secure emulation to say roughly the following: a protocol
ρ securely emulates a protocol φ if, for every adversary Adv for ρ, there is an
2 Hybrid arguments are used widely in cryptography to handle polynomial growth in
the number of composed protocols. We refer to [36] for an original description.
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tion φ‖Sim in the sense of ≤strongneg,pt. Note that every task-PIOA mentioned here
has polynomially bounded description, but potentially unbounded runtime. The
quantification over runtime bounds (i.e., schedule length bounds) are encapsu-
lated in the definition of ≤strongneg,pt. Moreover, the communications between ρ and
Adv and between φ and Sim are hidden from the environment.
We prove that secure emulation, thus defined, is indeed compositional un-
der a polynomial number of substitutions. This follows essentially as a corollary
of the composition theorem for ≤strongneg,pt. We also prove that secure emulation is
transitive and preserved under hiding. These three properties, as well as invari-
ant assertion and simulation relation techniques developed in [20, 37, 21, 30], are
very beneficial for the scalability of computational analysis. For example, the
composition theorem delineates situations in which multiple security protocols
are run in parallel and we would like to prove that the security guarantees of
individual component protocols are preserved in some appropriate sense. Also,
we may specify protocols at different levels of abstraction, and use simulation
relations to relate formally probability distributions on states (or executions) at
adjacent levels. Such techniques make up a practical discipline of verification,
since real-life security protocols operate not in isolation, but in the context of
larger systems.
Overview Section 2 summarizes the task-PIOA framework presented in [37, 21].
In Section 3, we review the approximate implementation definition proposed
in [20, 21], and introduce a new, stronger version of this definition, for which we
present a polynomial composition theorem. We then provide a generic template
for the use of task-PIOAs in cryptographic protocol specification, by defining
the notions of structure and adversary for structures in Section 4. Equipped
with these definitions, we define secure emulation in Section 5, and show it is
preserved under polynomial composition.
2 Task-PIOAs
In this section, we review basic definitions in the Task-PIOA framework [37,
30]. We begin with the PIOA framework, which is a simple combination of I/O
Automata [38] and Probabilistic Automata [39]. This is then augmented with a
partial-information scheduling mechanism based on tasks. Finally, we bring in
the notion of time bounds and its extension to task-PIOA families.
2.1 PIOAs
A probabilistic I/O automaton (PIOA) A is a tuple 〈Q, q¯, I, O,H,∆〉, where:
(i) Q is a countable set of states, with start state q¯ ∈ Q; (ii) I, O and H are
countable and pairwise disjoint sets of actions, referred to as input, output and
internal actions, respectively; (iii) ∆ ⊆ Q× (I ∪O∪H)×Disc(Q) is a transition
relation, where Disc(Q) is the set of discrete probability measures onQ. An action
5a is enabled in a state q if 〈q, a, µ〉 ∈ ∆ for some µ. The set Act := I ∪O ∪H is
called the action alphabet of A. If I = ∅, then A is said to be closed. The set of
external actions of A is I ∪O and the set of locally controlled actions is O ∪H.
Any sequence β of external actions is called a trace.
We require that A satisfies the following conditions.
– Input Enabling: For every q ∈ Q and a ∈ I, a is enabled in q.
– Transition Determinism: For every q ∈ Q and a ∈ A, there is at most
one µ ∈ Disc(Q) such that 〈q, a, µ〉 ∈ ∆.
Parallel composition for PIOAs is based on synchronization of shared actions.
PIOAs A1 and A2 are said to be compatible if Act i ∩Hj = Oi∩Oj = ∅ whenever
i 6= j. In that case, we define their composition A1‖A2 to be
〈Q1 ×Q2, 〈q¯1, q¯2〉, (I1 ∪ I2) \ (O1 ∪O2), O1 ∪O2,H1 ∪H2,∆〉,
where ∆ is the set of triples 〈〈q1, q2〉, a, µ1 × µ2〉 such that (i) a is enabled in
some qi and (ii) for every i, if a ∈ Ai then 〈qi, a, µi〉 ∈ ∆i, otherwise µi assigns
probability 1 to qi (i.e., µi is the Dirac measure on qi, denoted δ(qi)). Note
that this definition of composition can be generalized to any finite number of
components.
A hiding operator is also available: given A = 〈Q, q¯, I, O,H,∆〉 and S ⊆ O,
hide(A, S) is the tuple 〈Q, q¯, I, O′,H ′,∆〉, where O′ = O\S and H ′ = H∪S. Due
to the compatibility requirement for parallel composition, the hiding operation
prevents any other PIOA from synchronizing with A via actions in S.
2.2 Task-PIOAs
To resolve nondeterminism, we make use of the notion of tasks [38, 37]. Formally,
a task-PIOA is a pair (A,R) such that (i) A is a PIOA and (ii) R is a partition
of the locally-controlled actions of A. With slight abuse of notation, we use A to
refer to both the task-PIOA and the underlying PIOA. The equivalence classes
in R are referred to as tasks. Unless otherwise stated, we will use terminologies
inherited from the PIOA setting. The following axiom is imposed on task-PIOAs.
– Action Determinism: For every state q ∈ Q and every task T ∈ R, there
is at most one action a ∈ T that is enabled in q.
In case some a ∈ T is enabled in q, we say that T is enabled in q.
Given compatible task-PIOAs A1 and A2, we define their composition to
be 〈A1‖A2,R1 ∪ R2〉. Note that R1 ∪ R2 is an equivalence relation because
compatibility requires disjoint sets of locally controlled actions. It is also easy
to check that action determinism is preserved under composition. The hiding
operator for PIOAs extends in the obvious way: given a set S of output actions,
hide(〈A,R〉, S) is simply 〈hide(A, S),R〉.
A task schedule for a closed task-PIOA 〈A,R〉 is a finite or infinite sequence
ρ = T1.T2.T3 . . . of tasks in R. This induces a well-defined run of A as follows:
(i) from the start state q¯, we consider the first task T1;
(ii) due to action- and transition-determinism, T1 specifies at most one transi-
tion from q¯;
6(iii) if such transition exists, it is taken, otherwise nothing happens;
(iv) repeat with remaining Ti’s.
Such a run gives rise to a unique trace distribution of A (which is a probability
distribution on the set of traces). The set of trace distributions induced by all
possibly task schedules for A is denoted TrDists(A), while the trace distribution
induced by the task schedule ρ for A is denoted tdist(A, ρ). We refer to [30] for
more details on trace distributions.
2.3 Time Bounds and Task-PIOA Families
In order to carry out computational analysis, we consider task-PIOAs whose
operations can be represented by a collection of Turing machines with bounded
run time. This is the Time-Bounded Task-PIOA model introduced in [21, 20].
We assume a standard bit-string representation for various constituents of a
task-PIOA, including states, actions, transitions and tasks. Let p ∈ N be given.
A task-PIOA A is said to have p-bounded description just in case:
(i) the representation of every constituent of A has length at most p;
(ii) there is a Turing machine that decides whether a given bit string is the
representation of some constituent of A;
(iii) there is a Turing machine that, given a state and a task of A, determines
the next action;
(iv) there is a probabilistic Turing machine that, given a state and an action of
A, determines the next state of A;
(v) all these Turing machines can be described using a bit string of length at
most p, according to some standard encoding of Turing machines;
(vi) all these Turing machines return after at most p steps on every input.
Thus, p limits the size of action names, the amount of available memory and the
number of Turing machine steps taken at each transition of A. It, however, does
not limit the number of transitions that are taken in a particular run.
Suppose we have a compatible set {Ai|1 ≤ i ≤ b} of task-PIOAs, where each
Ai has description bounded by some pi ∈ N. It is not hard to check that the
composition ‖bi=1Ai has description bounded by ccomp ·
∑b
i=1 pi, where ccomp is a
fixed constant. (The proof of this result in an immediate extension of the binary
case described in [20, Lemma 4.2]).
To reason about the hiding operator in a setting with time bounds, we need
the notion of p-time recognizable sets. Given a set S of binary strings and p ∈ N,
we say that S is p-time recognizable if there is a probabilistic Turing machine M
satisfying: (i) in time at most p, M decides if a binary string a is in the set S,
and (ii) the description of M has at most p bits under some standard encoding.
If S ⊆ ActA for some PIOA A, then we say that S is p-time recognizable
if the set of binary representations of actions in S is p-time recognizable. We
claim there exists a constant chide such that, for any task-PIOA with p-bounded
description and any p′-time recognizable set S of output actions of A, the task-
PIOA hide(A, S) has chide(p+ p′)-bounded description [20, Lemma 4.4].
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is commonly referred to as the security parameter. We say that A has p-bounded
description for some p : N → N just in case: for all k, Ak has p(k)-bounded
description. If p is a polynomial, then we say that A has polynomially-bounded
description. The notions of compatibility, parallel composition and hiding are
defined pointwise. Time bound results for composition and hiding extend easily
to the setting of families.
3 Approximate Implementation
In [21, 20], we propose an approximate implementation relation for task-PIOAs
families, expressing the idea that every behavior of one family is computationally
indistinguishable from some behavior of another family. Following a traditional
approach in cryptography, this definition compares acceptance probabilities of a
distinguisher environment that runs in parallel with the task-PIOAs in question.
Moreover, it encapsulates additional quantification over schedule length bounds
and the choices of task schedules. These types of quantification are new chal-
lenges, presented by the fact that we do not impose a priori bounds on schedule
lengths (and hence on overall runtime) and that we allow nondeterministic spec-
ifications.
We shall first present the approximate implementation relation of [21, 20]
and state a composition theorem for single substitution. Then we discuss the
difficulties in generalizing to a polynomial number of substitutions. This leads
to a new, stronger definition of approximate implementation, for which we prove
a polynomial composition theorem.
3.1 The Weak Variant
We begin with the notions of acceptance probabilities and closing environment.
Let A be a closed task-PIOA with a special output action acc and let ρ be a
task schedule for A. The acceptance probability of A under ρ is defined to be:
Pacc(A, ρ) := Pr[β contains acc : β R←− tdist(A, ρ)], that is, the probability that
a trace drawn from the distribution tdist(A, ρ) contains the action acc. Now
suppose A is any task-PIOA, not necessarily closed. A task-PIOA Env is an
environment for A if it is compatible with A and A‖Env is closed. Throughout
this paper, we assume that every environment has acc as an output, so that we
may speak of acceptance probabilities of A‖Env .
Implementation relations are defined on task-PIOAs with the same external
interface. More precisely, A1 and A2 are said to be comparable if I1 = I2 and
O1 = O2. Observe that comparability implies A1 and A2 have the same set
of environments, up to renaming of internal actions. Suppose A1 and A2 are
indeed comparable. Let R≥0 denote the set of non-negative reals and let ² ∈ R≥0
and p, q1, q2 ∈ N be given3. We define A1 ≤p,q1,q2,² A2 as follows: given any
3 As a convention, we use variable p for description bounds and variable q for schedule
length bounds.
8environment Env with p-bounded description and any q1-bounded task schedule
ρ1 for A1‖Env , there exists a q2-bounded task schedule ρ2 for A2‖Env such that
|Pacc(A1‖Env , ρ1)−Pacc(A2‖Env , ρ2)| ≤ ². In other words, from the perspective
of an environment with p-bounded description, A1 and A2 “look almost the
same” provided A2‖Env may take q2 many steps whenever A1‖Env takes q1
many steps.
The relation ≤p,q1,q2,² can be extended to task-PIOA families in the obvious
way. Let A1 = {(A1)k}k∈N and A2 = {(A2)k}k∈N be (pointwise) comparable
task-PIOA families. Given ² : N → R≥0 and p, q1, q2 : N → N, we say that
A1 ≤p,q1,q2,² A2 just in case (A1)k ≤p(k),q1(k),q2(k),²(k) (A2)k for every k.
Restricting our attention to negligible error and polynomial time bounds,
we obtain the approximate implementation ≤neg,pt. Formally, a function ² :
N → R≥0 is said to be negligible if, for every constant c ∈ N, there exists
k0 ∈ N such that ²(k) < 1kc for all k ≥ k0. (That is, ² diminishes more
quickly than the reciprocal of any polynomial.) We say that A1 ≤neg,pt A2 if:
∀p, q1 ∃q2, ² A1 ≤p,q1,q2,² A2, where p, q1, q2 are polynomials and ² is a negligible
function.
The following binary composition theorem for ≤p,q1,q2,² and ≤neg,pt is proven
in [20].
Theorem 1. Let ² : N → R≥0 and p, p3, q1, q2 : N → N be given. Let A1,A2
and A3 be task-PIOAs families satisfying: A1 and A2 are comparable, and A3
has p3-bounded description and is compatible with both A1 and A2. Then the
following holds.
(1) If A1 ≤ccomp(p+p3),q1,q2,² A2, where ccomp is the constant factor associated with
description bounds in parallel composition, then A1‖A3 ≤p,q1,q2,² A2‖A3.
(2) If A1 ≤neg,pt A2 and p3 is a polynomial, then A1‖A3 ≤neg,pt A2‖A3.
Observe that, by induction, Theorem 1 generalizes to any constant number
of substitutions.
3.2 Towards Polynomial Composition
For cryptographic applications, it is desirable to generalize Theorem 1 even fur-
ther, to any polynomial number of substitutions. We now identify and discuss
a few issues associated with this generalization.
Let us first examine the logical structure of the definition of ≤neg,pt.
A1 ≤neg,pt A2 ⇔ ∀p, q1 ∃q2, ² A1 ≤p,q1,q2,² A2
⇔ ∀p, q1 ∃q2, ² ∀k,Env , ρ1 ∃ρ2
|Pacc((A1)k‖Env , ρ1)−Pacc((A2)k‖Env , ρ2)| ≤ ²,
where p, q1, q2 are polynomials, ² is a negligible function, Env is an environment
for A1 with p(k)-bounded description, ρ1 is a q1(k)-bounded task schedule for
A1‖Env , and ρ2 is a q2(k)-bounded task schedule for A2‖Env .
9The outermost quantifiers, ∀p, q1∃q2, ², capture computational requirements:
p bounds the description of a distinguisher environment, q1 bounds the total
number of steps that can be executed by A1 and an environment, q2 bounds the
total number of steps that can be executed by A2 and the same environment,
and ² bounds the difference in acceptance probabilities. Intuitively, ² represents
the degree to which A1 and A2 are indistinguishable, and we want to allow ²
to depend on the computation power of the distinguisher environment. Since
task-PIOAs do not have a priori bounds on the number of execution steps, we
need the quantification ∀q1∃q2 to determine the number of steps that can be
taken by A1‖Env and A2‖Env , respectively. Note that the computation power
of the environment is bounded by p · q1, therefore we allow ² to depend on both
p and q1. Moreover, the schedule length bound q2 may be larger than q1, giving
A2 some freedom to perform more internal steps.
The innermost quantifiers, ∀ρ1∃ρ2, deal with nondeterministic choices in A1
and A2. We require that every schedule for A1‖Env can be matched by some
schedule for A2‖Env . Here “matching” means the acceptance probabilities differ
by at most ².
We would like to obtain a polynomial composition theorem, which would
roughly say the following: given a polynomial b and two sequences of task-PIOA
families A11,A
2








2 for all i, the family Â1 de-
fined by (Â1)k := (A11)k‖ . . . ‖(A
b(k)
1 )k is again related by ≤neg,pt to the family Â2
defined by (Â2)k := (A12)k‖ . . . ‖(A
b(k)
2 )k. Such a theorem is proven in [35], with
the assumption that errors in acceptance probabilities are uniformly bounded;
that is, the same ² applies to Ai1 and A
i
2 all i. The proof uses a typical hybrid
argument, where, for each security parameter k, a sequence of b(k) + 1 hybrids
are constructed. The 0-th hybrid is (Â1)k, and the i + 1th hybrid is obtained
from the i-th hybrid by replacing (Ai+11 )k with (A
i+1
2 )k. It is then argued that,
since the error between each successive pair of hybrids is at most ²(k), the error
between the 0-th and b(k)-th hybrids is at most b(k) · ²(k). This is sufficient
because the b(k)-th hybrid is precisely (Â2)k and the function b · ² is negligible
whenever ² is negligible and b is polynomial.
In our setting, such a hybrid argument is much more difficult to construct, due
to the additional quantification over schedule length bounds and choices of task
schedules. To ensure that ² is independent of i, the uniformity condition becomes:
∀p, q1 ∃q2, ² ∀i Ai1 ≤p,q1,q2,² A
i
2. Unfortunately, this does not appear sufficient
for the hybrid argument, because, in order to guarantee the same error bound
² at each consecutive pair of hybrids, we would have to invoke the uniformity
condition with the same p and q1. This cannot be achieved because we have a
new schedule length bound q2, which need not be the same as q1.
To be more concrete, let us fix a security parameter k and consider, for exam-
ple, the 0-th hybrid (A11)k‖ . . . ‖(A
b(k)
1 )k. Let Env denote (A
2
1)k‖ . . . ‖(A
b(k)
1 )k.
Suppose we apply the uniformity condition with some appropriate p and q1,
obtaining q2 and ² such that every q1(k)-bounded schedule for (A11)k‖Env can
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be matched by some q2(k)-bounded schedule for (A12)k‖Env . Then, in order to
do the next replacement (i.e., replacing (A21)k with (A
2
2)k), we would have to
instantiate the uniformity condition with q2, leading to a possibly different error
bound ²′.
This suggests the outermost quantification ∀p, q1∃q2, ² in A1 ≤neg,pt A2 does
not capture correctly the idea that A1 and A2 are indistinguishable by the same
environment. Indeed, the schedule length bound q2(k) applies to the compos-
ite (A12)k‖Env , which may allow Env to take more steps than it does in the
composite (A11)k‖Env .
These observations inspire several changes to strengthen the definition of
≤neg,pt. We would like to make sure that the new bound q2 applies only to the
newly substituted component and not to the environment, and that the choice of
q2 does not depend on the computation power of the environment. Moreover, we
require that the tasks controlled by the environment are preserved at each sub-
stitution. These changes lead to a new approximate simulation relation, ≤strongneg,pt,
for which the uniformity condition can be invoked with the same bounds at each
step of the hybrid argument.
3.3 The Strong Variant
In order to implement the changes suggested above (in particular, to have sepa-
rate schedule length bounds for the components and the environment), we need a
notion of projection on task schedules. Suppose we have compatible task-PIOAs
A1 and A2 with A1‖A2 closed. Given a task schedule ρ for A1‖A2, proj1(ρ) is
defined to be the restriction of ρ to tasks in R1. Similarly for proj2(ρ).
Using this projection operator, we define a new implementation relation.
Definition 1. Let A1 and A2 be comparable task-PIOAs and let ² ∈ R≥0 and
p, q, q1, q2 ∈ N be given. We define A1 ≤q1,q2,p,q,² A2 as follows: given any envi-
ronment Env with p-bounded description and any task schedule ρ1 for A1‖Env
such that:
– projA1(ρ1) is q1-bounded, and
– projEnv (ρ1) is q-bounded,
there is a task schedule ρ2 for A2‖Env such that
– projA2(ρ2) is q2-bounded,
– projEnv (ρ1) = projEnv (ρ2), and
– |Pacc(A1‖Env , ρ1)−Pacc(A2‖Env , ρ2)| ≤ ².
This definition strengthens ≤p,q1,q2,² by requiring that the tasks controlled by
Env are not affected by the substitution. Moreover, the schedule length bounds
for the components and for the environment are considered separately, using
projections of task schedules.
The relation ≤q1,q2,p,q,² can be extended to task-PIOA families in the same
way as for ≤p,q1,q2,², and we claim that ≤q1,q2,p,q,² is transitive and preserved
under hiding, with certain adjustments to errors and time bounds. Precise state-
ments appear in Appendix A.
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We use ≤q1,q2,p,q,² to define the strong approximate implementation relation.
Definition 2. Suppose A1 and A2 are comparable task-PIOA families. We say
that A1 ≤strongneg,pt A2 if ∀q1 ∃q2 ∀p, q ∃² A1 ≤q1,q2,p,q,² A2, where q1, q2, p, q are
polynomials and ² is a negligible function.
Notice that, unlike in the definition of ≤neg,pt, the schedule length bound q2
for A2 no longer depends on the environment bounds p and q. This is crucial
for the hybrid argument in the composition proof for ≤q1,q2,p,q,² (Lemma 2).
More precisely, because of this property, the same q2 bound applies at each
substitution, even though the schedule length bound of the environment may
change due to previous substitutions4.
We now proceed to prove the polynomial composition theorem for ≤strongneg,pt.
Lemma 1 gives a description bound for the composition of b task-PIOAs, as-
suming the description bounds of the individual task-PIOAs are bounded by a
non-decreasing function.
Lemma 1. Let b ∈ N and a sequence of task-PIOAs A1,A2, . . . ,Ab be given.
Suppose there exists a non-decreasing function r : N → N such that, for all
i, Ai has description bounded by r(i). Then ‖iAi has description bounded by
ccomp · b · r(b), where ccomp is the constant factor for composing task-PIOAs in
parallel.
Proof. Since r is non-decreasing, we have ccomp ·
∑b
i=1 r(i) ≤ ccomp · b · r(b). uunionsq
Lemma 2 is essentially the hybrid argument in the polynomial composition
theorem for ≤strongneg,pt (Theorem 2). It shows that ≤q1,q2,p,q,² is “preserved” under
b-ary composition, provided the time bounds and errors are calibrated appropri-
ately.
Lemma 2. Let b ∈ N and two sequences of task-PIOAs
A11,A21, . . . ,Ab1 and A12,A22, . . . ,Ab2
be given. Assume that, in each sequence, all task-PIOAs are pairwise compatible.
Suppose there exist a non-decreasing function r : N→ N such that, for all i, both
Ai1 and Ai2 have description bounded by r(i).
Let q1, q2, q′2, p, p
′, q, q′ ∈ N and ², ²′ ∈ R≥0 be given. Assume the following.
(1) p = ccomp · (b · r(b) + p′), where ccomp is the constant factor for composing
task-PIOAs in parallel.
(2) q′2 = q1 + b · q2; q = q1 + b · q2 + q′; and ²′ = b · ².
(3) For all i, Ai1 and Ai2 are comparable and Ai1 ≤q1,q2,p,q,² Ai2.
Then we have ‖bi=1Ai1 ≤q1,q′2,p′,q′,²′ ‖bi=1Ai2.
4 Recall that, in a single step of the hybrid argument, the environment is the parallel
composition of the original environment and all protocol instances that are not being
replaced in the current step.
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Before diving into the proof of Lemma 2, we take a moment to dissect the
assumptions. First, we note that Assumption (3) is the uniformity condition,
saying that the same time bounds and error can be used for every index i. To
explain Assumptions (1) and (2), we need to briefly outline our proof strategy.
To prove ‖bi=1Ai1 ≤q1,q′2,p′,q′,²′ ‖bi=1Ai2, we take an environment Env for both
‖bi=1Ai1 and ‖bi=1Ai2. The description bound of Env is p′. In each step of the
hybrid argument, we perform exactly one substitution, with all other components
fixed. We may then view the composition of Env with all fixed components as
an environment Env ′ for the component being substituted. The description of
Env ′ is therefore bounded by p = ccomp · (b · r(b) + p′), as in Assumption (1).
Now, q1 is the schedule length bound for ‖bi=1Ai1. Since we don’t not know
how the tasks are distributed among the b components, we use a conservative
estimate: the schedule length bound for each Ai1 is also q1, as in Assumption (3).
Then, at each step of the hybrid argument, the schedule length increases by at
most q2, hence the schedule length bound for ‖bi=1Ai2 is q′2 = q1 + b · q2, as in
Assumption (2). Similarly, the schedule length bound for Env ′ at each step of
the hybrid argument must be at least q = q1 + b · q2 + q′, as in Assumption (2).
Finally, the errors accumulate at each step, so we multiply ² with a factor of b
to obtain ²′, as in Assumption (2).
Proof (Lemma 2). Let Â1 and Â2 denote ‖iAi1 and ‖iAi2, respectively. Unwinding
the definition of ≤q1,q′2,p′,q′,²′ , we need to prove: for every environment Env with
p′-bounded description and task schedule ρ1 for Â1‖Env such that
– proj bA1(ρ1) is q1-bounded, and
– projEnv (ρ1) is q′-bounded,
there exists task schedule ρ2 for Â2‖Env such that
– proj bA2(ρ2) is q′2-bounded,
– projEnv (ρ1) = projEnv (ρ2), and
– |Pacc(Â1‖Env , ρ1)−Pacc(Â2‖Env , ρ2)| < ²′.
Let such Env and ρ1 be given. For 1 ≤ i ≤ b − 1, let Hi denote the i-th
hybrid automaton: A12‖ . . . ‖Ai2‖Ai+11 ‖ . . . ‖Ab1.
Consider i = 1 and let Env1 := A21‖ . . . ‖Ab1‖Env . Clearly, Env1 is an en-
vironment for both A11 and A12 and, by Lemma 1 and Assumption (1), Env1
has p-bounded description. By the choice of ρ1, we know that projA11(ρ1) is q1-
bounded and projEnv1(ρ1) is (q1+ q
′)-bounded. By Assumption (2), projEnv1(ρ1)
is q-bounded.
Now we apply Assumption (3) and choose task schedule ρ2 for H1‖Env such
that
– projA12(ρ2) is q2-bounded,
– projEnv1(ρ1) = projEnv1(ρ2), and
– |Pacc(Â1‖Env , ρ1)−Pacc(H1‖Env , ρ2)| < ².
Note that, sinceA21 is part of Env1, projA21(ρ1) = projA21(ρ2). Therefore, projA21(ρ2)
is q1-bounded. Similarly, projH1(ρ2) is (q1+ q2)-bounded and ρ2 is (q1+ q2+ q′)-
bounded.
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Now consider i = 2 and let Env2 := A12‖A31‖ . . . ‖Ab1‖Env . As before, Env2 is
an environment for both A21 and A22, and it has p-bounded description. Moreover,
projA21(ρ2) is q1-bounded and, since ρ2 is (q1 + q2 + q
′)-bounded, projEnv2(ρ2) is
also (q1 + q2 + q′)-bounded. By Assumption (2), projEnv2(ρ2) is q-bounded.
Again, we apply Assumption (3) and choose task schedule ρ3 for H2‖Env
such that
– projA22(ρ3) is q2-bounded,
– projEnv2(ρ2) = projEnv2(ρ3), and
– |Pacc(H1‖Env , ρ2)−Pacc(H2‖Env , ρ3)| < ².
Note that, since A31 is part of both Env1 and Env2, we have projA31(ρ3) =
projA31(ρ2) = projA31(ρ1). Therefore, projA31(ρ3) is q1-bounded. Similarly, projH2(ρ3)
is (q1 + 2 · q2)-bounded and ρ3 is (q1 + 2 · q2 + q′)-bounded.
Repeating the same argument for all hybrid automata, we obtain
|Pacc(Â1‖Env , ρ1)−Pacc(Â2‖Env , ρb+1)|
≤ |Pacc(Â1‖Env , ρ1)−Pacc(H1‖Env, ρ2)|
+ |Pacc(H1‖Env , ρ2)−Pacc(H2‖Env , ρ3)|
+ . . .+ |Pacc(Hb−1‖Env , ρb)−Pacc(Â2‖Env , ρb+1)|
< b · ² = ²′
Moreover, since Env is part of Env i for every i, we know that projEnv (ρb+1) =
projEnv (ρ1). Finally, we have that proj bA2(ρb+1) is bounded by q′2 = q1 + b · q2.
This completes the proof that Â1 ≤q1,q′2,p′,q′,²′ Â2. uunionsq
Theorem 2 now follows as a corollary of Lemma 2. Essentially, we expand the
definition of ≤strongneg,pt and instantiate the time bounds and error with appropriate
values.
Theorem 2 (Polynomial Composition Theorem for ≤strongneg,pt). Let two se-
quences of task-PIOA families A11,A
2




2, . . . be given, with A
i
1 com-
parable to Ai2 for all i. Assume further that, in each sequence, all task-PIOA
families are pairwise compatible.
Suppose there exist polynomials r, s : N → N such that, for all i, k, both
(Ai1)k and (A
i
2)k have description bounded by r(i) · s(k). Assume that r is non-
decreasing. Assume further that
∀q1 ∃q2 ∀p, q ∃² ∀i Ai1 ≤q1,q2,p,q,² A
i
2, (1)
where q1, q2, p, q are polynomials and ² is a negligible function. (This is a strength-
ening of the statement ∀i Ai1 ≤strongneg,pt A
i
2.)
Let b be any polynomial. For each k, let (Â1)k denote (A11)k‖ . . . ‖(A
b(k)
1 )k.
Similarly for (Â2)k. Then we have Â1 ≤strongneg,pt Â2.
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Proof. By the definition of ≤strongneg,pt, we need to prove:




′, q′ are polynomials and ²′ is a negligible function.
Let polynomial q′1 be given and set q1 := q
′
1. Choose q2 according to Assump-
tion (1) in the theorem statement. Set q′2 := q1 + b · q2. Let polynomials p′ and
q′ be given. Define:
(i) p := ccomp · (p′+ b · (r ◦ b)), where ccomp is the constant factor for composing
task-PIOAs in parallel;
(ii) q := q1 + b · q2 + q′.
Now choose ² using q1, q2, p, q and Assumption (1), and define ²′ := b · ².
Let k ∈ N be given. Observe that




2)k, . . . , (A
b(k)
2 )k,
– the function s(k) · r and
– the numbers b(k), q1(k), q2(k), q′2(k), p(k), p
′(k), q(k), q′(k), ²(k), ²′(k)
satisfy the assumptions in the statement of Lemma 2. Therefore we may conclude
that (Â1)k ≤q1(k),q′2(k),p′(k),q′(k),²′(k) (Â2)k. Since q1 = q′1, this completes the
proof. uunionsq
To conclude this section, we obtain the constant composition theorem for
≤strongneg,pt (Corollary 1) as a corollary of Theorem 2. For this special case, we need
not assume a uniformity condition, because we can consider maximum time
bounds and maximum errors. We use the fact that ≤q1,q2,p,q,² is preserved if we
relax the time bound q2 and the error bound ².
Lemma 3. Let A1 and A2 be comparable task-PIOAs and let q1, q2, p, q ∈ N
and ² ∈ R≥0 be given. Assume A1 ≤q1,q2,p,q,² A2. For any qˆ2 ≥ q2 and ²ˆ ≥ ², we
have A1 ≤q1,qˆ2,p,q,²ˆ A2.
Corollary 1. Let B ∈ N and two sequences of task-PIOA families A11,A
2





2, . . . ,A
B
2 be given, with A
i
1 comparable to A
i
2 for all i. Suppose there
exists polynomial s : N→ N such that, for all i, k, both (Ai1)k and (A
i
2)k have de-
scription bounded by s(k). Assume further that Ai1 ≤strongneg,pt A
i
2 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ B.
For each k, let (Â1)k denote (A11)k‖ . . . ‖(A
B
1 )k. Similarly for (Â2)k. Then
we have Â1 ≤strongneg,pt Â2.
Proof. We claim that Assumption (1) in Theorem 2 is satisfied. Let polynomial





Let qˆ2 be any polynomial upperbound of q12 , . . . , q
B
2 .
Let polynomials p and q be given. For each i, choose negligible function ²i




2. Let ²ˆ be max(²
1, . . . , ²B).
Now we haveAi1 ≤q1,qi2,p,q,²i A
i
2 for all i. By Lemma 3, this impliesA
i
1 ≤q1,qˆ2,p,q,²ˆ
Ai2 for all i, which is precisely Assumption (1) in Theorem 2.
Finally, let b be the constant polynomial B and let r be the constant poly-
nomial 1. We apply Theorem 2 to conclude that Â1 ≤strongneg,pt Â2. uunionsq
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4 Structures
In the previous sections, we defined and established properties of our model of
concurrent computation, which is not specific to cryptographic protocols. On
top of this “foundational layer”, this section introduces our “security layer”.
In the spirit of [17], we first define structures, which we use to specify pro-
tocols. To this purpose, we classify external actions of a task-PIOA into two
categories: environment actions and adversary actions. Intuitively, environment
actions are used to model the functional input/output interface of a protocol,
whereas adversary actions are used to model network communications. This al-
lows us to impose syntactic constraints on adversary task-PIOAs so that they
do not have immediate access to protocol inputs and outputs.
Definition 3. A structure pi is a pair 〈A,EAct〉, where A is a task-PIOA and
EAct is a subset of the external actions of A, called the environment actions. The
set of adversary actions is defined to be AAct := (I∪O)\EAct. For convenience,
we also define: (i) EI := EAct ∩ I ( environment inputs), (ii) EO := EAct ∩ O
( environment outputs), (iii) AI := AAct ∩ I ( adversary inputs) and (iv) AO =
AAct ∩O ( adversary inputs).
The notion of structure suggests the following definition of an adversary that
may interact with a structure.
Definition 4. An adversary for the structure pi = 〈A,EAct〉 is a task-PIOA
Adv satisfying the following conditions: (i) Adv is compatible with A, (ii) AI ⊆
ActAdv , and (iii) ActAdv ∩EAct = ∅.
In other words, Adv is a compatible task-PIOA that interacts with pi via
adversary actions only, and Adv provides all adversary inputs to pi.
Two structures pi1 and pi2 are said to be comparable if EI 1 = EI 2 and EO1 =
EO2. Notice, unlike comparability for task-PIOAs, comparability for structures
ignores differences in adversary actions.
Two structures pi1 and pi2 are compatible if A1 and A2 are compatible task-
PIOAs and Act1 ∩Act2 = EAct1 ∩EAct2. That is, every shared action must be
an environment action of both structures. Composition is straightforward: given
compatible pi1 and pi2, their composition pi1‖pi2 is the structure 〈A1‖A2,EAct1∪
EAct2〉. This definition can be extended to any finite number of components. We
observe that an adversary for a composition of structures is also an adversary for
each of the component structures. A proof of this result is given in Appendix C.
Finally, we consider hiding for structures. Given a structure 〈A,EAct〉 and
a set S of output actions of A, we define hide(〈A,EAct〉, S) to be the structure
〈hide(A, S),EAct \ S〉.
Time Bounds A structure pi = (A,EAct) is said to have p-bounded description if
A has p-bounded description and EAct is p-time recognizable. We observe that
the composition of bounded structures has a description bound linear in the sum
of component bounds. Similarly, the hiding operator increases the description
bound by a fixed constant factor. More details about these results are available
in Appendix B.
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Structure Families Given a family p¯i of structures and a function p : N→ N, we
say that p¯i has p-bounded description if pik has p(k)-bounded description for every
k. If p is a polynomial, then we say that p¯i has polynomially-bounded description.
The notions of comparability, compatibility and parallel composition are de-
fined pointwise. Similarly for the notion of an adversary family.
If S¯ = {Sk}k∈N is a family of sets of actions, we say that S¯ is polynomial-
time recognizable if there is a polynomial p such that every Sk is p(k)-time
recognizable. It is not hard to check that, given any family p¯i with polynomially-
bounded description and a polynomial-time recognizable family S¯ of sets of
actions, the family hide(p¯i, S¯) is again polynomial time-bounded. Those results
are detailed in Appendix B.
5 Secure Emulation
Equipped with the notions of polynomial-time-bounded structure and adver-
sary families, we have now enough machinery to formulate our secure emulation
notion. To this purpose, we follow the standard definition of universal compos-
ability/simulatability [19, 17].
Definition 5 (Secure Emulation). Suppose φ and ψ are comparable structure
families. We say that φ emulates ψ (denoted φ ≤SE ψ) if, for every adversary
family Adv for φ with polynomially bounded description, there is an adversary
family Sim for ψ with polynomially bounded description such that:
hide(φ‖Adv ,AActφ) ≤strongneg,pt hide(ψ‖Sim,AActψ).
Transitivity of ≤SE follows immediately from transitivity of ≤strongneg,pt.
Dummy Adversaries Observe that, in the definition of ≤SE, the adversary actions
of φ and ψ are hidden, which prevents an environment from synchronizing on
those actions. At first sight, this limits the amount of information available to
the environment and hence reduces its distinguishing power. However, one can
show that no power is actually lost, because there exist adversaries that behave
simply as forwarders between Env and the protocols. These are the so-called
dummy adversaries and below we give a canonical construction.
Let φ be a structure family and, for each k ∈ N, let fk be a bijection from
AActφk to a set of fresh action names. We refer to f = {fk}k∈N as a renaming
of adversary actions for φ, and we write f(φ) for the result of applying fk to φk
for every k. Consider the adversary Adv(φk, fk) defined in Figure 1.
The following lemma shows that dummy adversaries have transparent be-
havior. This fact is used to in the proof of our main composition theorem (The-
orem 3).
Lemma 4. Let Adv(φ, f) denote the family {Adv(φk, fk)}k∈N. Note that f(φ)
and hide(φ‖Adv(φ, f),AActφ) are comparable. Let A be a task-PIOA family com-
patible with both f(φ) and hide(φ‖Adv(φ, f),AActφ). Assume that, for all k,





AOφk ∪ fk(AI φk )
Output:
fk(AOφk ) ∪AI φk
Tasks
forward := fk(AOφk ) ∪AI φk
States
pending ∈ AOφk ∪ fk(AI φk ) ∪ ⊥, initially
⊥
Transitions:
a ∈ AOφk ∪ fk(AI φk )
Effect:
pending := a










Fig. 1. Task-PIOA Code for Dummy Adversary
Proof. Let q1 be any polynomial and set q2 := 2q1. Let p, q be any polynomials
and ² be the constant polynomial 0. Fix k ∈ N and let Env be an environ-
ment for fk(φk)‖Ak and for φk‖Adv(φk, fk)‖Ak. Let ρ be a task schedule for
fk(φk)‖Ak‖Env such that projfk(φk)‖Ak(ρ) is q1(k)-bounded and projEnv (ρ) is
q(k)-bounded.
We construct a task schedule ρ′ for φk‖Adv(φk, fk)‖Ak‖Env as follows: given
any task T that is not locally controlled by Env , we replace T with T.forward.
Note that, by construction, projhide(φk‖Adv(φk,fk),AActφk )(ρ
′) is q2(k)-bounded and
projEnv (ρ) = projEnv (ρ′). Moreover, we have by assumption that f(AI φk) ⊆
ActAk , hence we have sufficiently many forward tasks to guarantee
Pacc(fk(φk)‖Ak‖Env , ρ) = Pacc(hide(φk‖Adv(φk, fk),AActφk)‖Ak‖Env , ρ′).
uunionsq
Composition We now prove that ≤SE is preserved under polynomial-sized com-
position, provided certain uniformity assumptions are satisfied.
Theorem 3. Let two sequences of pairwise compatible structure families φ1, φ2, . . .
and ψ1, ψ2, . . . be given, with φi comparable to ψi for all i.
Suppose there are renamings f1, f2, . . . and polynomials r, s : N → N such
that the following hold.
(1) r is non-decreasing.
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(2) For all i, φi‖Adv(φi, f i) has description bounded by r(i) · s. (The family
Adv(φi, f i) is a dummy adversary family, as in Lemma 4.)
(3) There exist adversary families Sim1,Sim2, . . . for ψ1, ψ2, . . . such that
(a) for all i, ψi‖Simi has description bounded by r(i) · s, and
(b) ∀q1 ∃q2 ∀p, q ∃² ∀i
hide(φi‖Adv(φi, f i),AActφi) ≤q1,q2,p,q,² hide(ψi‖Simi,AActψi),
where q1, q2, p, q are polynomials and ² is a negligible function.
Let b be any polynomial. For each k, let φ̂k denote φ1k‖ . . . ‖φb(k)k . Similarly
for ψ̂k. Then we have φ̂ ≤SE ψ̂.
Proof. Let Adv be an adversary family for φ̂ with polynomially bounded descrip-
tion. We need to construct an adversary family Sim for ψ̂ with polynomially
bounded description such that:
hide(φ̂‖Adv ,AAct bφ) ≤strongneg,pt hide(ψ̂‖Sim,AAct bψ).
Observe that the renamings f1, f2, . . . induce a renaming for φ̂ in the ob-
vious way: for each k, fk := f1k ∪ . . . ∪ f b(k)k . This is well defined because the
compatibility definition for structures requires the sets of adversary actions to
be pairwise disjoint.
Let Âdv and Ŝim be adversary families defined as follows: for each k,
Âdvk := Adv(φ1k, f
1
k )‖ . . . ‖Adv(φb(k)k , f b(k)k ), and
Ŝimk := Sim1k‖ . . . ‖Simb(k)k ,
where Sim1,Sim2, . . . are given as in the statement of the theorem.
We observe the following.
hide(φ̂‖Adv ,AAct bφ)
≡neg,pt hide(f(φ̂)‖f(Adv), f(AAct bφ)) property of renaming
≤strongneg,pt hide(φ̂‖Âdv‖f(Adv), f(AAct bφ) ∪AAct bφ) Lemma 4
≤strongneg,pt hide(ψ̂‖Ŝim‖f(Adv), f(AAct bφ) ∪AAct bψ) Theorem 2
≡neg,pt hide(ψ̂‖hide(Ŝim‖f(Adv), f(AAct bφ)),AAct bψ) property of hiding
Diagrams depicting these task-PIOAs and the communications between them are
in Figure 2. We define Sim to be hide(Ŝim‖f(Adv), f(AAct bφ)). This completes
the proof. uunionsq
Let us now compare the assumptions of Theorem 3 with the more intuitive
assumption that φi ≤SE ψi for all i. The latter is not sufficient for two reasons.
– We need to ensure that the composites φ̂ and ψ̂ have polynomially bounded
description. The same applies to the adversary families Âdv and Ŝim. There-




























































Fig. 2. Diagram for the Construction of Sim
allow the complexity to grow with i, as long as the growth in i is indepen-
dent of the growth in the security parameter k. This is important because our
compatibility condition requires disjoint sets of locally controlled actions: as
i grows, action names need to contain more bits. (This can be thought of as
the need to have distinct session IDs for different protocol instances.)
– Assumption (3b) is the so-called uniformity condition on the error in sim-
ulation. We require that the same error bound ² works for all instances i.
This prevents the errors from growing with i, otherwise the total error may
no longer be negligible.
We present two examples of applications of this composition theorem further
in this section.
Hiding Our secure emulation relation is preserved when we hide any set of
environment output actions of the related structures. This result can be natu-
rally used to model the behavior of protocols privately synchronizing with sub-
protocols.
Theorem 4. Suppose φ and ψ are comparable structure families such that φ ≤SE
ψ. Suppose also that B ⊂ EOφ is a family of sets of environment output actions
of φ. Then, hide(φ,B) ≤SE hide(ψ,B).
Proof. Suppose φ, ψ and B are defined as in the hypotheses. Unwinding the
assumption that φ ≤SE ψ, we obtain that, for every polynomial time-bounded
adversary family Adv for φ, there is a polynomial time-bounded adversary family
Sim for ψ such that hide(φ‖Adv ,AActφ) ≤strongneg,pt hide(ψ‖Sim,AActψ).
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Using the definition of adversaries, we observe thatActAdv ∩B = ActSim ∩B =
∅. This guarantees that Adv is an adversary family for hide(φ,B) and that Sim is
an adversary family for hide(ψ,B). Now, using the hiding property of ≤strongneg,pt, we
obtain that hide(hide(φ‖Adv ,AActφ), B) ≤strongneg,pt hide(hide(ψ‖Sim,AActψ), B).
Using the set intersection relations above and the fact that we only hide environ-
ment external actions, this implies hide(hide(φ,B)‖Adv ,AActhide(φ,B)) ≤strongneg,pt
hide(hide(ψ,B)‖Sim,AActhide(ψ,B)), as needed. uunionsq
Applications We state two simple corollaries illustrating the use of our compo-
sition theorem: the first one considers composition for a polynomial number of
copies of a single structure family, while the second considers composition for a
constant number of distinct structure families. Proofs for these corollaries appear
in Appendix D.
Corollary 2. Suppose φ and ψ are comparable polynomial-time-bounded struc-
ture families such that φ ≤SE ψ. Let g1, g2, . . . be renaming functions, each
mapping actions of φ and ψ to fresh names. Suppose further that applying the
renaming gi to the family φ or ψ does not increase their time-bounds more than
by a polynomial factor in the index i.
Let b be a polynomial. For each k, let φ̂k denote g1(φk)‖ . . . ‖gb(k)(φk), and
similarly for ψ̂k. Then we have φ̂ ≤SE ψ̂.
Corollary 3. Let φ1, . . . , φB and φ1, . . . , ψB be pairwise compatible polynomial-
time-bounded structure families, with φi ≤SE ψi for every i. Then, we have
φ1‖ · · · ‖φB ≤SE ψ1‖ · · · ‖ψB.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we introduced a new approximate implementation relation for
task-PIOAs, the ≤strongneg,pt relation, and showed that it supports composition the-
orems for polynomially growing task-PIOA families. Building upon this ≤strongneg,pt
relation, we presented a secure emulation relation, following the logical statement
of universal composability/simulatability, and proved this relation is transitive
and preserved under hiding. It also supports composition theorems for polyno-
mially growing structure families. These three properties, as well as the invariant
assertion and simulation relation techniques developed in [37, 21], are essential
for the scalability of protocol analysis.
In future works, we would like to consider dynamic creation definitions for
task-PIOAs: this would allow us to model environments (or structures) that can
dynamically create new protocol instances at run time, as it is performed through
the dynamic ITM invocation mechanism in the UC framework or through the
bang operator “!” in the IITM framework. We believe such an enrichment to
our framework would allow us to prove a stronger claim about the existence of
simulators. Namely, there is a single simulator that can simulate b many protocol
instances for any polynomial b.
21
We would also like to apply the model and methods we developed here to an-
alyze security protocols that have not yet been the subject of much formal study,
such as timing-based and long-lived security protocols, where our separation be-
tween the bounds on description and schedulers seems especially meaningful.
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A Results for Task-PIOAs
We state the transitivity of the ≤q1,q2,p,q,² and ≤strongneg,pt relations, and claim these
relations are preserved when output actions of the related automata are hidden.
Lemma 5. Suppose A1, A2 and A3 are comparable task-PIOAs such that
A1 ≤q1,q2,p,q,²12 A2 and A2 ≤q2,q3,p,q,²23 A3. Then, A1 ≤q1,q3,p,q,²13+²23 A3.
Lemma 6. Suppose A1 = {(A1)k}k∈N, A2 = {(A2)k}k∈N and A3 = {(A3)k}k∈N
are comparable task-PIOA families such that A1 ≤strongneg,pt A2 and A2 ≤strongneg,pt A3.
Then, A1 ≤strongneg,pt A3.
Lemma 7. Suppose A1 and A2 are comparable task-PIOA families such that
A1 ≤q1,q2,p,q,² A2. Suppose also that B is set of output actions of both A1 and
A2. Then, hide(A1, B) ≤q1,q2,p,q,² hide(A2, B).
24
Lemma 8. Suppose A1 = {(A1)k}k∈N and A2 = {(A2)k}k∈N are comparable
task-PIOA families such that A1 ≤strongneg,pt A2. Suppose also that B = {Bk}k∈N is
a family of sets of output actions of A1 and A2, that is, Bk is a set of output
actions of both (A1)k and (A2)k. Then, hide(A1, B) ≤strongneg,pt hide(A2, B).
The proof of these lemmas are similar to those appearing as [20, Lemma 4.9,
4.31, 4.11, and 4.33].
B Results for Structures
We consider the behavior of structures when they are composed.
Lemma 9. There exists a constant ccomp such that the following holds. Suppose
pi1, pi2, . . . , pin are compatible structures, where, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the structure
pii is bi-time bounded. Then, pi1‖ · · · ‖pin is ccomp(b1 + · · · + bn)-bounded. Also,
the composition of n polynomial time-bounded structures is also a polynomial
time-bounded structure.
Proof. Similar to the proofs of [20, Lemma 4.2 and 4.26].
Corollary 4. Suppose pi = {pik}k∈N is a family of structures, such that each pik
is the composition of p(k) q(k)-time bounded structures. Then pi is a polynomial
time-bounded family of structure, bounded by the polynomial ccomppq.
Proof. Lemma 9 guarantees that pik is ccomp(p(k)q(k))-time bounded.
The compatibility of two structures is preserved when we compose these
structures with a third one.
Lemma 10. Suppose pi1 and pi2 are comparable structures, and pi3 is a structure
that is protocol-compatible with each of pi1 and pi2.
Then pi1‖pi3 and pi2‖pi3 are comparable structures.
Proof. Write pi1 = (A1,EAct1), pi2 = (A2,EAct2), and pi3 = (A3,EAct3). We
show the two conditions in the definition of comparability:
1. EI 1 ∪ EI 3 − (EO1 ∪ EO3) = EI 2 ∪ EI 3 − (EO2 ∪ EO3).
Since pi1 and pi2 are comparable structures, we know that EI 1 = EI 2 and
EO1 = EO2. Let a ∈ EI 1 ∪ EI 3 − (EO1 ∪ EO3). There are two cases:
(a) a ∈ EI 1 − EO3. Then a ∈ EI 2, so a ∈ EI 2 − EO3. Since a ∈ EI 2, we
have a 6∈ EO2. So a ∈ EI 2 ∪ EI 3 − (EO2 ∪ EO3), as needed.
(b) a ∈ EI 3 − EO1. Then a 6∈ EO2, so a ∈ EI 3 − EO2. Since a ∈ EI 3, we
have a 6∈ EO3. So a ∈ EI 2 ∪ EI 3 − (EO2 ∪ EO3), as needed.
The converse direction is similar.
2. EO1 ∪ EO3 = EO2 ∪ EO3.
Since EO1 = EO2, this is immediate.
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Time bounds of structures evolve as those of task-PIOAs when sets of output
actions are hidden.
Lemma 11. There exists a constant chide such that the following holds. Suppose
pi is a p-time-bounded structure, and S is a p′-time recognizable subset of the
output actions of pi. Then hide(pi, S) is a chide(p+ p′)-time-bounded structure.
Lemma 12. Suppose pi is a polynomial-time-bounded structure, and S is a polynomial-
time recognizable family of subset of the output actions of pi. Then hide(pi, S) is
a polynomial-time-bounded structure.
The proofs of these result are similar to those appearing in [20, Lemma 4.3
and 4.33].
C Adversary for Composed Structures
The following lemma relates signatures of adversaries and is used in the proof
of Theorem 3.
Lemma 13. Suppose φ and ψ are comparable structures, Adv is an adversary
for φ, Sim is an adversary for ψ, and hide(φ‖Adv ,AActφ) ≤strongneg,pt hide(ψ‖Sim,AActψ).
Then, OAdv − AActφ = OSim − AActψ, IAdv − AActφ = ISim − AActψ, and
ExtAdv −AActφ = ExtSim−AActψ.
Proof. Follows from the fact that φ and ψ are comparable structures, and that
hide(φ‖Adv ,AActφ) and hide(ψ‖Sim,AActψ) must be comparable task-PIOAs.
Next we show that an adversary for the composition of several structures is
an adversary of any of theses structures.
Lemma 14. Suppose pi and φ are compatible structures, and Adv is an adver-
sary for pi‖φ. Then Adv is an adversary for φ. Also, if pi and P are compatible
structure families, and Adv is an adversary family for pi‖P . Then Adv is an
adversary family for P .
Proof. Suppose pi and φ are compatible structures, and Adv is an adversary for
pi‖φ. We observe that the three conditions of Definition 4 are satisfied.
1. Adv is compatible with φ. This follows from the fact that Adv is compatible
with pi‖φ.
2. ExtAdv ∩Extφ ⊆ AActφ. Since Adv is an adversary for pi‖φ, we know that
ExtAdv ∩(Extpi ∪Extφ) ⊆ AActpi∪AActφ. This implies that ExtAdv ∩Extφ ⊆
AActpi ∪ AActφ. We observe now that AActpi ∩ AActφ = ∅ and AActpi ∩
EActφ = ∅, since pi and φ are compatible structures. This implies that
AActpi ∩ Extφ = ∅, which in turn guarantees that ExtAdv ∩Extφ ⊆ AActφ.
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3. AI φ ⊆ OAdv . Since Adv is an adversary for pi‖φ, we know that (AActφ ∪
AActpi) ∩ ((Iφ ∪ Ipi) − (Oφ ∪ Opi)) ⊆ OAdv . This first implies that AActφ ∩
(Iφ−(Oφ∪Opi)) ⊆ OAdv . Next, since Iφ∩Oφ = ∅, we have that AActφ∩(Iφ−
Opi)) ⊆ OAdv . By distributivity, we also have that AActφ∩Iφ−AActφ∩Opi ⊆
OAdv . The compatibility conditions of pi and φ now imply that AActφ∩Opi =
∅, which provides the relation AActφ ∩ Iφ ⊆ OAdv , as needed.
The extension to structure families and adversary families is straightforward.
D Proof for Applications of the Composition Theorem
Proof (of Corollary 2). Let us write φi and ψi for gi(φ) and gi(ψ) respectively.
Since the gi functions are just renaming functions, we have φi ≤SE ψi for every
i.
Consider now, for every index i, the adversary family Adv(φi, f i) for φi (fol-
lowing the definition used in Lemma 4), where the renamings f i are such that
φi‖Adv(φi, f i) is bounded by r1(i) · s where r1 and s are polynomials. The se-
cure emulation relations above imply that there exist polynomial-time-bounded
adversary families Sim1,Sim2, . . . for ψ1, ψ2, . . . (respectively) such that:
(a) for every i, the task-PIOA ψi‖Simi is bounded by r2(i) · s, where r2 is
a polynomial (this can be stated because the renaming functions do not
increase the length of action names too much, and because all Simi automata
can be chosen identical up to action renaming), and
(b) ∀q1 ∃q2 ∀p, q ∃² ∀i
hide(φi‖Adv(φi, f i),AActφi) ≤q1,q2,p,q,² hide(ψi‖Simi,AActψi),
where q1, q2, p, q are polynomials, and ² is a negligible function.
As a result, by defining r as a non-decreasing polynomial majoring r1 and
r2, we can apply Theorem 3 and obtain that φ̂ ≤SE ψ̂, as needed. uunionsq
Proof (of Corollary 3). Suppose f1, . . . , fB are renaming functions for the ad-
versary actions of φ1, . . . , φB , such that the increase of the length of the action
names of φik through f
i is bounded by some polynomial in k. Suppose further
that Adv(φ1, f1), . . . , Adv(φB , fB) are dummy adversary families as defined in
Lemma 4.
Since B is constant, and since φi ≤SE ψi for every i ∈ [B], there are ad-
versary families Sim1, . . . , SimB for ψ1, . . . , ψB such that, ∀q1 ∃q2 ∀p, q ∃² ∀i
hide(φi‖Adv(φi, f i),AActφi) ≤q1,q2,p,q,² hide(ψi‖Simi,AActψi), where q1, q2, p,
q are polynomials, and ² is a negligible function.
Now, the result follows of the use of Theorem 3 where r is a constant, s is
a polynomial bounding the description of φi‖Adv(φi, f i) and ψi‖Simi for every
i ∈ [B], and b is the constant B. uunionsq
